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Origin and Early Years of the National
Labor Relations Act*
By J. WAmmN MADDEN"
IT is good for the participants in any institution to think about and
discuss the history of their institution, even though this folklore is
entirely familiar to them. The institution of the law of labor relations
has a Founding Father, Senator Robert F Wagner of New York.
Starting as an m-migrant boy from Germany, he found in the city and
state of New York the opportunity to forge for himself a career which
culminated in his service for several terms in the United States
Senate. During the critical periods of the Great Depression, he brought
into being more important and enduring legislation than any other
member of Congress has done in our history Of this legislation, the
statute which, in common speech, bears his name is, of course, the one
which is the foundation of the imposing structure of labor law in the
United States.
Something of the story of the enactment of the Wagner Act' should
be recounted here. In June, 1933, shortly after the new administration
had taken office, the National Industrial Recovery Act2 was passed. It
provided that the various industries could establish codes providing
minimum wages and maximum hours to prevent cut-throat competi-
tion. The act contained section 7(a), which provided that every code
should contain a provision that employees should have the right to
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing. Even though section 7(a) created no enforcement ma-
chinery, the President, without any statutory authority, appointed a
National Labor Board consisting of distinguished representatives of
labor and of industry, with Senator Wagner as chairman.
In spite of the low level of some 3,000,000 to which uion member-
ship had fallen and the continued high level of unemployment unions,
* This article was the basis of an address delivered at the Luncheon Meeting of the
Section on Labor Law of the American Bar Association at Montreal, Canada on August
9, 1966.
** Professor of Law, University of Califorma, Hastings College of the Law. Semor
judge, United States Court of Claims. Sits frequently by assignment of Chief Justice of
United States Supreme Court with United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
149 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
2 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
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incited by section 7(a), demanded recognition and collective bargain-
ng but were rebuffed by most employers, including all the big em-
ployers. The Senator, in Ins experience as Chairman of the Labor
Board, learned that the refusal of employers to bargain, and their
creation of "employee representation plans," better known as company
unions, were prolific causes of strikes.
Within a year after the passage of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, Senator Wagner drafted a statute, modeled after the Federal
Trade Commission Act,5 creating a quasi-judicial tribunal with defined
legal authority and power to have its orders enforced by court decree.
In February, 1934, the proposed statute was introduced in the Senate,
and extensive hearings were held in the Senate Committee. Mr.
Wagner urged that the National Industrial Recovery Act was having
little success due to the lack of mass purchasing power winch resulted
from low wages and high unemployment and that section 7(a) was
not being obeyed since it contained no enforcement power. Industry's
spokesmen were unammously opposed to the bill, and it became
apparent that it could not be enacted at that session. As a compromise,
in June, 1934, Congress enacted Resolution 44,4 which authorized the
President to establish a board or boards to investigate situations re-
lating to section 7(a) of the Recovery Act. The only power, other
than the power to investigate, given to the board by Resolution 44,
was the power to conduct elections by secret ballot in order to deter-
mine the employees' choice as to representatives for collective bar-
gaining.
The President promptly appointed a distinguished board of three
men, none of whom represented industry or labor. The experience of
this board may have been educational but it was also completely frus-
trating. It functioned until May, 1935, when the United States Su-
preme Court held the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitu-
tional.5 In the meantime, Senator Wagner, recognizing that Resolution
44 was substantially worthless, introduced a bill similar to Ins 1934
bill. Again, extensive hearings were held and the same opposition de-
veloped. Leon Keyserling, the Senator's Administrative Assistant who
worked mitimately with the Senator on this project, writes:
[Tihe legislation was opposed by organized industry with a force and
fervor and expenditure of funds perhaps unparalleled. It was vehe-
mently opposed by almost all of the press, ranging from the persistent
38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-71 (1964).
448 Stat. 1183 (1934).
5 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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opposition of the New York Times to the less responsible tirades of
less circumspect journals. It was roundly condemned by so eminent
and sincere an editorialist as Mr. Walter Lippman, who said: "If the
bill were passed, it could not be made to work It is preposterous
to put such a burden upon mortal men The bill should, I believe,
be scrapped. "6
Frank R. Kent of the Baltimore Sun called the Senator a 'labor addict"
for championing the bill. Some left wing labor spokesmen opposed the
bill because it would lead to government intervention in umoinsm.
In the presence of the President, influential senators asked Mr.
Wagner to withdraw the bill. Only after the bill's passage by the
Senate, and when it seemed certain that the House would pass it, did
the President give it his endorsement. No member of the President's
cabinet, or of his brain trust, gave Wagner any help in getting the bill
passed. And Keyserling points out that even in their memoirs, in which
they admitted participation in the great accomplishments of the New
Deal Era, none claimed any credit for the Wagner Act.7 To again quote
Keyserling:
While it is true that [Wagner's] proposal could not have become
law in the political climate of 1928, nor perhaps in the climate of
1938, it is equally true that there would never have been a Wagner
Act or anything like it at any time if the Senator had not spent him-
self in this cause to a degree which almost defies description.8
The Senator's hope was that his law would make American working
men free, by permitting them to join forces with their fellow workmen
instead of standing alone and insignificant; that it would, in time, make
them and their country affluent, by creating a great mass purchasing
power for the products of American industry He was right on both
counts.
The United States Supreme Court, as mentioned above, invalidated
the National Industrial Recovery Act in May of 1935.9 Congress was
anxious to do something but doubtful as to what it had power to do.
It was aware that if it passed an unconstitutional law the Supreme
Court would correct its error. Nevertheless, Senator Wagner's bill was
passed by Congress on July 2, 1935, and signed by the President on
July 5. The new act was to be administered by a three-man board
appointed by the President. Ultimately the appointees were to serve
6 Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Ortgn and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 199, 201-02 (1961).
7 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
8 Keyserling, supra note 6, at 201.
9 Schecater Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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five year terms, but the terms of the initial three appointees were to
run for one, three, and five years so that expiration of the terms would
be staggered. Although it was July, and Congress in those days was
often hopeful of adjourning in July, the President did not hurry to ap-
point the members of the new board. There was much unemployment,
even among persons who had had good salaries before the depression,
and these board positions carried $10,000 salanes, but apparently
there was no msistent clamor by anyone to get appointed to the new
board.
I was, at the time, a teacher of Real Property at the University of
Pittsburgh Law School. I knew no more about the Wagner Act than
what was written in Pittsburgh newspapers and in Time magazine.
By the sheerest of accidents, I had served in 1933 on a Pennsylvania
Governor's Commission, appointed to investigate a remarkable Penn-
sylvania mstitution known as the Coal and Iron Police; and in 1934 I
acted as arbitrator in a rather dull contract renewal arbitration be-
tween the Pittsburgh Street Car company and its employees. About
August 20, 1935, I received a telephone call from the Solicitor of the
Department of Labor, speaking for the Secretary, asking me to come
to Washington that afternoon and talk about a place on the new
Labor Board. My wife and children were excited, as was I. My visit
with the Secretary before dinner occupied about a half-hour. She told
me that she had discussed my qualifications with two good men who
knew me. I told her that I was a teacher of Real Property and knew
practically nothing about Labor Law She said that was good; that
I would have no prejudices. We agreed to meet again at ten that mght
at her house. At that meeting she told me she was authorized to offer
me the chairmanship of the Board and the five year term. She also told
me that my colleagues would be economists who had practical ex-
perience in labor relations. I accepted the Secretary's offer.
Let us remind ourselves of the time, effort, thought and sacrifice
which Senator Wagner had invested in this statute for which he had
such high hopes and of Walter Lippman's statement that the statute
could not be made to work; that it is preposterous to put such a burden
upon mortal men.10 With this in mind, what is the explanation for
selecting the operating engineer of this delicate and complicated piece
of machinery by a process about as casual as the picking of a name out
of a hat by a blind man. I know of no explanation. But having in mind
some professors, as well as some business executives and lawyers, who
have gone to Washington, I think that, considering the method of
10 See text at note 6 supra.
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selection, it is not immodest for me to say that the result could have
been worse.
The President sent the nominations to the Senate on the eve of
adjournment, which had been delayed for a time by a one-man fili-
buster by Senator Huey Long. Since the names of my colleagues were
favorably known, and mine was unknown, the Senate confirmed the
nominations without debate.
The Board's first meeting was on August 27, 1935. There I became
acquainted with the staff of people who had served the Resolution 44
Board and had, by statute, been assigned to serve the new Board if it
desired to retain them. The Resolution 44 Board had set up Regional
Offices in some 20 principal cities of the country These holdover
people knew the new statute throughly and had been busy making
plans for its administration. Their knowledge was of great help to the
Chairman. The General Counsel of the Resolution 44 Board, Professor
(later Judge)Calvert Magruder was returning to his position on the
Harvard Law Faculty, and as a replacement he found for us Mr.
Charles Fahy, counsel of the Petroleum Board. Thus Mr. Fahy and
I came to the Labor Board at the same time, both without the ad-
vantage of the "head start" winch most of our staff had over us. Mr.
Fahy has since gone much farther in a distinguished career, becoming
the Solicitor General of the United States and a judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. We could not
have had a better General Counsel.
Just nine days after the Board's first meeting, the first of the slings
and arrows, to which we were to become accustomed, arrived. The
"National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League" called
a press conference in Washington and distributed copies of its "Report
on the Constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act.""i The
committee members, whose names were printed in the report, were
58 in number, and the list was a real "who's who in American Law"
A former Attorney General of the United States, two former Solicitors
General, presidents of bar associations, lawyers for great business
enterprises, and leaders of the bar in principal cities were among those
who subscribed to the "Report."
This document is worthy of special mention because, I think, no
such writing will ever occur again. It was in the form of a 132 page
legal brief. Its introduction was a summary which concluded with
this language:
11 NATiONAL LAwYERs Cointrr oF THE AM CAN LrmBTY LEAcuE, CONSTrru-
TiONALrry OF THE NATIONAL LABOn RELATIONS Aar (September 5, 1935).
March, 1967]
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Considenng the Act m the light of our history, the established form
of government and the decisions of our highest Court, we have no
hesitancy in concluding that it is unconstitutional and that it consti-
tutes a complete departure from our constitutional and traditional
theories of government.' 2
These fifty-eight lawyers had no client. The Board had not proceeded,
nor even threatened to proceed, against anyone. So this definitive legal
advice was just broadcast at large pro bono publico.
I have no doubt that the "Report" did great harm not only to the
Board, in creating resistance to obedience to and enforcement of the
law, but to clients of lesser lawyers who, relying on the dictum of the
58 distinguished lawyers, advised their clients that they could violate
the law with impunity and thereby involved them in expensive litiga-
tion and charges for back pay I think that had any one of these 58
lawyers had a paying client who sought advice on the question of
whether the act was valid, the lawyer could not have given a definitive
answer to his client's question. His research would have brought him
to the conclusion that the act would probably be held unconstitutional,
but there were precedents such as Danbury Hatters,13 Second Cor-
onado,14 Bedford Stone'5 and other cases which might lead to the op-
posite result. In any event, the "Report" was an impertinence and
was probably so regarded by the United States Supreme Court.
In spite of the condemnation of the new statute by important
lawyers and editors, it was not for us to throw m the towel. But careful
maneuvering was called for, lest we find ourselves in the United
States Supreme Court with a weak case. That had happened to the
Government m the Schechter Poultry case,'0 later known as the "sick
chicken case," in which the Supreme Court had invalidated the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act. The staff people of the board were
able to settle unimpressive cases, or persuade umons not to press such
cases, in order to protect our Supreme Court strategy We were for-
tunate as well as careful, and m due time we reached the Supreme
Court with five cases which fairly presented the constitutionality of
our law as applied to a variety of situations.
Our cases were not argued m the Supreme Court until February,
12 Id. at x-x.
'3 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (Danbury Hatters).
14Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 265 U.S. 295 (1925) (Second
Coronado).
15 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. journeyman Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927)
(Bedford Stone).
16 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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1937, and in the meantime, that Court was makng important decisions,
some of which were not at all promising for our project. In January,
1936, the Court held the important Agricultural Adjustment Act un-
constitutional.' That case did not involve labor, and the Government
was relying on the taxing power rather than the commerce power.
But the decision did show that the Court was still relentless in nar-
rowly interpreting the Constitution. In May of 1936, the Court decided
the case of James Walter Carter v. the Carter Coal Company,8 which
did involve statutory wage-fixmg and price-fixing in the depressed
coal industry The opinion repeated earlier statements of the Court
that manufacturing was not interstate commerce but preceded such
commerce, and applied the same rule to mining. 9 We were greatly dis-
couraged by the Carter decision. °
'7 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
i8 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
'9 Id. at 303-04.
20 One staff member, who had a talent for rhyming, tried to cheer us up by com-
posing a song about Carter, winch he sang to the tune of "The Wreck of the Old '97"
T'was the 18th of May
And the birds so merry
Sang round the Court House door.
Came James Walter Carter
On a writ of certiorari
A-cryin" that Ins hurt was sore.
Oh, Mr. Chief Justice and all your justices
rve traveled a weary road
To tell you my troubles,
And the burden of this is
They've hit me with a soft-coal code.
They's a tryin" to take away my right
To cut my miners' wages.
They's socked me with a draw-back tax.
They's a whitlin' and a chawin
At my profits when I needs them
To pay my surplus income tax.
Will the court stand up for freedom
Or deny Mr. Carter?
The question stood that way.
There was joy in the heart of the tax-payin" martyr,
When up spake Sutherland, J.
"I opine this statute has to do
With miners black and smelly
Who earn their bread from coal,
But if no bread's forthcoming for a wholly local belly,
The Government has no control.
March, 1967]
Our activities proceeded on the assumption that the Wagner Act
was our valid authority, but perhaps we were, as President Johnson
said when describing the troubles which assail hun from all directions,
"in the position of a jack rabbit in a hailstorm, hunkered up and taking
it." Some federal appellate courts had held, quite early, that our ad-
versaries could not, by injunction, prevent us from holding hearings,
but that they had to go through the statutorily provided procedure; and
if they lost before the Board, they were required by statute to seek re-
view in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal.2 1 The Board and
its hearing officers were frequently charged with being lax about the
adnssion of evidence. Our statute, like most of the statutes creating
administrative, quasi-judicial agencies, provided that we were not
bound by the rules of evidence. On one occasion, the Board itself was
hearing a case which involved an important manufacturer of truck
trailers. The vice-president of the company was questioned by the
Board counsel about the employment of a Pinkerton spy to undermine
the union, which had lost all 29 of its members. The company counsel
objected, urging that the relation between a labor spy and Ins em-
ployer is a privileged relation which is not subject to disclosure at a
hearing. I forewent the opportunity, perhaps a unique one, of making
this addition to the list of privileged relations. The story, when it was
told, was not a pleasant one: the spy put the names of union members
on pieces of paper which he deposited in agreed places; the Vice-
president picked them up, memorized them and burned the papers,
and a day or two later discharged the union men from lingering
overlong in the toilet or smoking in a forbidden place or some other
infraction of company rules; when the union men were all discharged
the spy was ostentatiously marched to the door and discharged, taking
with him the contents of the union treasury, he being the treasurer.
Evidence of such unfair labor practices, which were not only viola-
tions of the statute but were morally reprehensible, tended to divert
the point of interest from the question of whether such practices oc-
curred, to the naked constitutional question of whether it was the
business of the federal government to interfere.
"So James Walter Carter
You may cut your miners' wages
In the West Virginia hills.
But if pnce wars nun you,
Remember that us sages
Regards those as local ills."
21 E.g., E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 85 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1936);
Bradley Lumber Co. of Arkansas v. NLRB, 84 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1936).
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The Supreme Court decisions in our cases came down on April 12,
1937 2 They were, of course, surprising. But it would be equally sur-
prising to hear someone argue today that the federal government,
given by the Constitution the power to foster and protect interstate
commerce, must stand helpless in the face of an event which stops
ore trams in Minnesota, ships on the Great Lakes, freight trams in
Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia and barges on the Ohio River,
because the event occurred inside the gates of a steel mill in Aliquippa,
Pennsylvania. I do not pursue this argument farther to include, for
example, a barbecue stand in Alabama. But I can understand and
sympathize with the Supreme Court's inability to draw a line anywhere
short of de minmm s. 3
22 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLBB v. Fnedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301
U.S. 58 (1937); Associated Press v. NLBB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Washington, Va. &
Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
2 3 In 1937, Professor Calvert Magruder sent me a poem written by the class poet of
his Labor Law class at Harvard. The poem is based upon an actual decision of the
Board. So it is good law. You may judge whether it is good poetry-
Alice in Labor Land (1937 Anonymous)
When Alice had decided that she was a silly ass
To waste her time exploring lands within the looking glass
While man like Warren Madden, Johnme Lewis, Willie Green
At logical illogic far surpassed the King and Queen.
She tripped up to a factory which to her untutored gaze
Appeared just like a factory of the horse and buggy days
When stupid sort of people thought that laborers should work
And speeches should be given by such lads as Edmund Burke.
And other sorts of people had the charming nalvet6
That made them think employers were entitled to last say.
Said Alice to the foreman: "How about a job for me.
For I would be a credit to your goddam company.
"Well really," said the foreman, "I'm afraid you'll have to go,
For I gather from your diction you espouse the C.I.0:'
"Why, you economic royalist, you nasty so and so,"
Replied our lovely Alice, "I'll report to Uncle Joe."
So Joseph Warren Madden, at sweet Alice's behest,
Just took the little matter to his fond maternal breast.
But his milk of human kindness, at the outset, seemed to curdle
For he really hadn't reckoned on so difficult a hurdle.
The factory in question did not have a job to fill
Which to less resourceful bodies would have seemed a bitter pill.
March, 19671
It gives one a good feeling to be held legitimate by the United
States Supreme Court; to know, after all, that one has not been presid-
ing over a kangaroo court. Our work increased, since unions and
workmen naturally expected more of the Board after the Supreme
Court decisions. The great mass-production industries of the country,
now having good legal advice, came to terms with the law But even
before the Supreme Court decisions, the AFL-CIO civil war in the
lalior movement had occurred. It posed hard problems of statutory
interpretation and many of our decisions made all of the involved
parties unhappy But these decisions were the first steps in the forma-
tion of legal doctrines, most of which are still the law
I return for a moment to the Founding Father, Senator Wagner.
I have told you how casual he was about the selection of those who
would operate the delicate machine which he had taken such extra-
ordinary pains to create. That hands-off attitude was maintained
throughout the five-year period of my chairmanslnp of the Board.
There was constant newspaper and magazine criticism of the Board's
decisions; there were hearings before Senate committees and a full-
dress investigation of the Board by a House Special Committee; yet
never once in the five years did the Senator make a suggestion as to
how we might better do our work. I am sure that he would have re-
garded it as a tragedy if we had wrecked his machine, but I am not
at all sure that he would have intervened to prevent even that.
While on the subject, I will say something about the Board's
relations with the President On a number of occasions when the
Board seemed to be in even more of a crisis than usual, my colleagues
urged me to go see the President, explain our predicament and ask for
his help, but I never did that. Considering that the President and Is
advisers regarded the Board as a political liability, I thought that we
were lucky that he left us strictly alone. I felt that he did not under-
stand very well what we were doing; that if I went to hin for help I
would also get advice; that the advice might not be good but even if
bad it would be embarrassing not to follow it.
On one single occasion did the President ask me to have the Board
The Board would not be beaten, they just all let down their hair
And solemnly they chanted "unfair, unfair, unfair."
So let there be created here a preferential list.
From hiring aught but Alice you must cease, you must desist.
It really doesn't matter, as a worker Alice stinks,
Or that she's rich as Croesus, or a stone-head like the Sphinx.
You'll take her in your factory so that by this you may know
You cannot take in vain the mystic letters, C.I.O.
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take certain action. In 1938, Senator Wagner was running for re-
election. The President told me that he was hearing from New York
that "Bob is in trouble." He had a formidable Republican opponent,
and throughout the country, there were prospects of Republican re-
surgence. The New York Times had, for the first time in Wagner's
political career, come out against him, principally because of connec-
tion with the Wagner Act. There was a strong implication in the
President's conversation that the Wagner Act was a political albatross.
The President's request was that the Board so revise its rules as to
allow employers to petition for elections of collective bargaining rep-
resentatives for their employees. I explained to the President why
such a revision of the rules, at that early time in the development of
umons, would not be good. The President seemed convinced, and I
left. We did not revise our rules.
The election was held two weeks later, and there was Republican
resurgence, in the country and in New York. Governor Lehman was
re-elected over Mr. Dewey by only 50,000 votes. Senator Wagner, with
a majority of 500,000, bore the albatross heroically That was the only
opportunity I ever had to play a role in party politics but I did not
take the opportunity If I had removed the albatross, perhaps the
Senator would have gotten all the votes.
As I observe the Board's activities today, from a discreet distance,
I can only say that the work of the Board is voluminous and complex,
which may be partly due to the 1947 and 1959 amendments and partly
due to fine points in the statute which the Board and the labor bar of
the 1930's were too unsophisticated to discover. I am sure that the
Board in recent years has not been engaged in crude empire building,
but I am glad that I served with the Board during the 1930's and not
more recently In those days, there were very few gadgets on the
instrument panel; we switched on the ignition, cranked up the machine
and were off.
The great Learned Hand, in his little book, the Spirit of Liberty,
said:
But I believe that the history of commissions is very largely this:
When they start, they are filled with enthusiasts, and they are flexible
and adaptive. Like all of us after they have proceeded a while
they get their own set of precedents, and precedents 'save the m-
tolerable labor of thought' and they fall into grooves When they
get into grooves, then God save you to get them out of the grooves.24
Before the Labor Board became respectable, Judge Hand made
24 L. Hand, The Spi-it of Liberty (3d ed. 1960).
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an offensive remark about the Board to one of our lawyers who was
arguing before him. When I was told of the incident I sent the Judge
an offensive telegram. A good while thereafter, we became good
friends, and still later, I sat with Judge Hand on his court. He was
still making offensive remarks to counsel, but I had become a judge
and was fitting snugly into my groove; so I kept silent.
But the Labor Board, though it has become highly respectable, has
never become stuffy or bogged down in a groove. It has done its work
with intelligence and distinction, and I am proud to claim a place in
its family tree.
Sequel
The address upon which the foregoing pages were based was made
to an audience of persons actively engaged in labor law litigation and
administration. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, I had no
useful information or advice to give to such a group of specialists. I
therefore talked to them about the early history of the National Labor
Relations Act and its administration. The less specialized readers of
the Journal might, after reading the address, be left wondering what
ever became of the enterprise which was, in the beginning years, the
subject of much controversy, and of some eminent opinion that its
basic law was unworkable.
Those unfriendly to the Act were hopeful that the Supreme Court
would dispose of it by holding it unconstitutional. That hope was dis-
appointed by the Court's decisions in April, 193725 But it was, after
all, only a statute, and was and is subject to repeal by Congress. There
was agitation for its repeal. I recall a cartoon of the times which pic-
tured a well-groomed lady saying to her friend: "My husband seems to
have recently developed a great interest in vaudeville. I heard him
cry out in his sleep last night, 'Kill the Wagner Actl'" But Congress
did not repeal the Act. It did not even amend it until 1947, when it
enacted the Taft-Hartley Act. That Important statute added to the
original Act provisions creating unfair labor practices on the part of
labor unions. By 1947 the Wagner Act had been in effective operation
for ten years, long enough to establish general recognition of the
rights of labor. It was not too early for Congress to impose some re-
strictions on the activities of labor umons, and it did so in the Taft-
Hartley Act. If it had not been for the expanded view of the constitu-
tional powers of Congress under the commerce power, which view was
25 Cases cited note 22 supra.
2661 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
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first expressed by the Supreme Court in the Jones & Laughlin case in
1937,27 there would have been no valid constitutional basis for the
Taft-Hartley Act. Thus those who were unfriendly to labor and to the
Labor Board, and who deplored the Supreme Court's 1937 decision,
were able, in 1947 to build upon the foundation of that decision in
imposing restrictions upon labor. One of the provisions of the Taft-
Hartley Act, giving to each state the option of forbidding "union-shop"
contracts if the state so chooses, has been the subject of political pro-
test by union labor ever since 1947 "Right to work" laws, by which
states make use of that option, are the subject of political agitation in
some states, and Congress is constantly urged, unsuccessfully, to repeal
that provision of the 1947 Act.
There has been important litigation in recent years about the
extent to which the federal labor laws have "preempted" the field
and disabled states from having labor laws of their own.28 In Cali-
forma, in the past year, much attention has been given to absence of
labor unions among field workers in agriculture. The Wagner Act
expressly excluded agricultural workers from its coverage. That ex-
clusion probably did not express any intention on the part of Congress
that farm workers should not be allowed to have unions. It meant
only that Congress was not willing to extend national protection to
an effort by farm workers to organize and join unions. It would follow
that the subject is not preempted by federal law, and that if a state
desired to enact a law covering this subject it would be free to do so.29
The second of the important statutes amending the Wagner Act
was not enacted until 1959, twelve years after the Taft-Hartley Act.
This was the Landrum-Griffin Act.30 Its provisions regulate in great
detail the conduct of the internal affairs of labor unions including
their elections of officers and their management of funds. Detailed re-
ports to union members and to the Secretary of Labor are required. The
prediction, made at the time the unions are urging the enactment of
the Wagner Act, that if they induced the Government to involve itself
in labor matters to protect labor from abuses by employers, they
would, sooner or later, find themselves subjected to Government regu-
lation, has been fulfilled. On March 2, 1967, the National Labor
Relations Board in an impressive ceremony took notice of the fact
27NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
28 For a discussion of preemption m labor law see Updegraff, Preemption, Predict-
ability and Progress tn Labor Law, 17 HASTGS L.J. 473 (1966).
29 The subject of preemption has many and vaned applications winch will not even
be mentioned m tis article.
8073 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).
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that the Board, in performing its important function of ascertaining
the choice of employees of "representataves of their own choosing" for
collective bargaining had, a few days earlier, received the 25 millionth
ballot in its long series of secret ballot elections held for that purpose.
To me it was significant that one of the sponsors of the luncheon which
was a part of the celebration was the National Association of Manu-
facturers.
The National Labor Relations Act, the administration of which
this writer had a part in its early years, is still a lively, interesting and
useful part of our law It has, I think, more nearly fulfilled the hopes
of its author than any other miportant statute in our history Senator
Wagner hoped that it would make the working people of the country
confident and free, and that their prosperity would insure the pros-
perity of their country
